RESEARCH DOSSIER
Offshore Insurance-Linked Securities Issuer Markets
Abstract. Offshore insurance-linked securities issuer markets organize the legal and operational production of instruments that transfer insurance risk to capital-market investors. This monograph examines the geography of that production, distinguishing the incorporation and authorization of special-purpose issuers from the geography of insured exposure, securities listing, sponsor residence, investor location, and the custody of supporting assets. The investigation combines documentary institutional comparison, historical transaction-count analysis and comparison of regulatory statistics with issuer announcements. Within Aon's disclosed Rule 144A issuance universe for the twelve months ending June 30, 2021 and June 30, 2022, Bermuda accounted for 74.51% and 75.93% of transactions respectively. The number of represented domiciles increased while the count-based Herfindahl–Hirschman index increased from 0.5794 to 0.5905. These observations describe concentration in a specified historical sample, rather than market power or the contemporary global distribution of risk-bearing capital. More recent Bermuda instrument registrations and Cayman Islands Class C license statistics establish the continuing institutional significance of the hubs but employ different statistical populations. The direct International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) catastrophe bonds for Jamaica demonstrate how the identity of issuer, beneficiary and intended exchange can diverge even within successive transactions for the same protection program. The central analytical conclusion is that geographical diversification of insurance securitization requires separate assessment of institutional functions and exposure concentrations. Growth in the number of domiciles or venues cannot independently establish diversification of insured risks or operational resilience. The evidence supports a comparative market interpretation; it does not establish causal domicile premiums, a comprehensive contemporary global market share, or a newly proposed scientific theory.
Keywords: insurance-linked securities; offshore insurance; catastrophe bonds; issuer domicile; special purpose insurers; Bermuda; Cayman Islands; Singapore; Hong Kong; market concentration; insurance markets; reinsurance; risk transfer; financial geography; exchange listing; supervisory statistics
Introduction
Insurance markets convert uncertain future obligations into present contractual arrangements. The transfer of a specified portion of those obligations to investors extends the resources available to the insurance system. It also generates institutional tasks which do not coincide with the location of an insured building, the home jurisdiction of a cedent or the place where a capital-market investor maintains a portfolio. A catastrophe bond requires contractual coordination between the risk beneficiary and the parties that commit capital; the institution responsible for the instrument can be established thousands of miles from the covered exposure.
The geographic organization of this activity is the subject of the monograph. It is part of the investigation of the global offshore system within insurance science. An offshore issuer market is understood here as a location in which entity formation, authorization, transaction servicing and related facilities support securities through which insurance risk is transferred across jurisdictional boundaries. Offshore describes a relationship between institutional location and the insurance activity served. It is not a judgment about the legality, integrity, or taxable status of a transaction. A jurisdiction may support both local and international transactions, and a given transaction may combine offshore and onshore functions.
The capital-market segment examined most closely is the catastrophe bond sector, because its relatively visible transaction information permits a meaningful geographical comparison. The broader ILS universe also encompasses instruments related to mortality, longevity, medical costs and other risks, as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC, 2025) explains in its insurance-linked securities overview. Private collateralized reinsurance and sidecars may perform comparable economic functions while generating quite different public records. An examination of catastrophe bonds therefore supplies a material part of the evidence for offshore ILS markets, not a census of all alternative reinsurance capital.
The research asks three closely related questions. Which measurable activity establishes that a jurisdiction functions as an issuer market? How should the concentration of such activity be interpreted when instruments, transactions and licensed entities differ in their statistical units? What follows for the assessment of market development and institutional resilience when the legal issuer, exchange and underlying exposure can occupy different locations? Answering these questions requires integrating market observations with documentary evidence of the institutions that enable them.
The source base comprises public descriptions from supervisory authorities, exchange and government statements, an original brokerage statistical exhibit, peer-reviewed research, OECD comparative studies, and transaction announcements by a multilateral issuer. Historical comparisons use their own stated observation windows; continuously updated regulatory tables are dated to the particular observation examined. Academic results are interpreted within the scope of the accessible publication material. Numerical calculations in this monograph are descriptive transformations of stated data, with separate hypothetical examples identified as such. No proprietary transaction-level database, complete subscription books, legal opinions, protected supervisory returns, or instrument-by-instrument audit has been obtained.
This is an investigation of the structure and geography of issuer markets. Detailed choice-of-law doctrines, individual investor disclosure obligations, actuarial catastrophe modeling and the design of bond waterfalls belong to adjacent research objects. Their relevance here arises from their consequences for the location and continuity of securitization services. The intellectual contribution is a comparative interpretation supported by transparent calculations and documented cases. Its value resides in the precision of the distinctions and the ability to draw bounded conclusions from incomplete but genuinely relevant records.
Object of research and geographical attribution
A security is insurance-linked when its contractual financial performance depends upon the realization of a specified insurance-related risk. In a conventional catastrophe bond arrangement a sponsor obtains coverage through a transaction in which a special-purpose vehicle assumes defined risk and issues notes to investors. Investors commit principal which ordinarily supports the vehicle's corresponding liabilities. Subject to the transaction's event definition, loss-allocation terms and other conditions, part or all of that principal may become available to the risk beneficiary. The remaining contractual claims of investors are settled according to the terms.
The mechanism differs from borrowing for ordinary corporate expenditure. The contingent reduction of investor claims forms part of the provision of insurance capacity. The economic substance is therefore dependent on the relationship between the liability of the risk-transferring party, the contingent payment and the security obligation. The exact structure can vary substantially. A direct multilateral issuer may undertake the debt obligation without using a conventional special-purpose issuer, whereas an investor-funded reinsurance sidecar can assume an agreed portfolio share rather than a precisely defined catastrophe layer.
Several geographical attributes are involved.
| Attribute | Object identified | Illustrative observation |
|---|---|---|
| Issuer domicile | Legal establishment of the issuing vehicle | Place of incorporation |
| Authorization location | Supervisory perimeter of the insurance vehicle | Relevant insurance license |
| Sponsor location | Residence of the party seeking or arranging protection | Cedent's jurisdiction |
| Exposure location | Territory to which insured or index risk relates | Hurricane or earthquake region |
| Listing location | Exchange on which admission is sought or obtained | Exchange announcement |
| Capital and service location | Investor, trustee, custodian or operational provider location | Independently documented holding or service relationship |
The table separates the objects that a geographic label can describe. In an ordinary analysis of international trade, identifying the origin of a good requires knowledge of its production process. In international insurance securitization, identifying the origin of an instrument requires knowledge of the contractual and institutional function being attributed. An issuer incorporated in one location, supervised there and listed elsewhere can be an entirely ordinary unit within the market; the sponsor and investor affiliations can add still more locations.
This distinction matters for statistics. If a note is incorporated in Bermuda and admitted to an exchange in Singapore, it contributes to one Bermuda domicile total and one Singapore venue total. Both entries may be correct. Adding them as if they represented distinct transactions would count the same financial instrument twice. Treating them as substitutes imposes the incorrect assumption that authorization and admission are the same activity. An investigator interested in market infrastructure would preserve both entries and record the relationship.
The multilateral structures documented in IBRD Capital-at-Risk Notes (World Bank Treasury, n.d.) demonstrate why a classification must admit an additional category. The bank can issue capital-at-risk debt directly. A series identifier associated with such a bond does not constitute evidence of an independently incorporated special-purpose insurer in its proposed listing jurisdiction. A domicile series designed for insurance vehicles should disclose how it treats direct issuance; a broader issuer series should classify the actual institutional issuer without constructing a fictional offshore vehicle.
A second distinction concerns the degree of financial intermediation. The legal instrument is the unit through which investors acquire contingent exposure, but the location of the vehicle is only one element of the production of that instrument. Transaction arrangement, event measurement, portfolio modeling, legal advice, administration, collateral custody and servicing may be distributed among providers in several countries. Their allocation is not inferred from the corporate address. The relative prominence of a domicile can therefore coexist with international distribution of work.
The resulting scientific object has a practical boundary. A jurisdiction with a documented insurance securitization framework but negligible observed issuance may represent a potential or developing issuer market. A venue with substantial admission activity and little domestic issuance may represent a major listing market. A place in which investors manage large ILS allocations may represent a capital source. These are related descriptions, and the evidence for any one of them does not establish the magnitude of the others.
Measurement of offshore issuer markets
Statistical comparability begins with an explicit unit. The number of licensed special-purpose insurance entities at a reporting date is a stock. The number of newly licensed entities during an interval is a flow. Neither is identical to the number of transactions completed during that interval. A single vehicle can participate in successive transactions. A transaction may include more than one tranche, and additional securities can be issued under a continuing program. Outstanding principal is in turn a monetary stock affected by maturities, redemptions, principal impairment and additional issuance.
The distinction between a unit of issuance and a unit of risk is equally consequential. Consider two hypothetical deals, one consisting of three tranches of $100 million each and the other of a single $300 million tranche. Each deal has the same initial face value. One transaction-count series would record two deals. A tranche-count series would record four notes. A monetary-volume series would allocate equal shares to the two deals. All three descriptions are meaningful if their denominators are properly specified. Assigning a jurisdiction a 75% share by tranche count when the issue-size share is 50% may be useful for understanding administration workload, but would be misleading as a statement about risk-bearing principal.
A similar divergence appears in the public market figures that NAIC (2025) attributes to Artemis. The second-quarter 2025 market figures report approximately $10.5 billion across 38 transactions and 58 tranches. This implies about 1.53 tranches per transaction and an approximate mean issuance size of $276 million per transaction. The calculations use rounded published volume. They describe the sample only. Dividing the volume by 58 instead would yield about $181 million per tranche, answering a different question. The contemporaneous outstanding stock of approximately $56.7 billion cannot be obtained merely by multiplying the quarter's issuance by four.
Let n(j,t) denote the number of qualifying transactions attributed to domicile j within interval t. The transaction share is s(j,t) = n(j,t) / N(t), where N(t) is the sum of the domicile counts for the included population. If a complete amount series is available, define a separate volume share v(j,t) = V(j,t) / V(t). A transaction share can be computed without knowing the size of each transaction. It cannot thereby become an estimate of the volume share.
For the count distribution, the Herfindahl–Hirschman index H(t) is the sum over domiciles of squared s(j,t). Its minimum for an exactly equal distribution across k positive categories is 1/k; the upper endpoint is one. Its reciprocal gives the effective number of equally represented locations for the observed distribution. A jurisdictional HHI is a geographical concentration measure. Conventional competition-law thresholds are inapplicable absent a separately established product market, substitutability analysis, independently controlled firms and the legal context of any evaluation.
Amounts could be measured by issued nominal principal, current outstanding principal or contractual maximum payout. The choice follows the research question, and the currencies and dates used in aggregation must be documented. For a catastrophe bond that has suffered a principal reduction, the initial issue amount and current outstanding principal may differ. A conventional rolling outstanding-stock identity is:
O(t) = O(t-1) + I(t) - M(t) - P(t) + A(t),
where I is new principal added, M scheduled and early principal repayments, P write-downs not already included in M, and A other scope, reclassification or valuation adjustments needed to reconcile the chosen series. All terms must share the same currency and valuation convention. If an event settlement and a repayment are both recorded under the same adjustment, the identity requires excluding the duplicate from the other term. This prevents the apparent disappearance of more principal than was exposed.
A market geography database requires stable deal and instrument identifiers. A researcher should preserve the original currency field and the exchange-rate convention rather than overwrite the original observation; record incorporation and license identifiers separately; date every transaction and observed listing; distinguish an anticipated listing from an exchange-confirmed admission; and preserve event settlement and maturity status. The same sponsor may appear as a protected entity, an arranging group or a reinsurer assuming and transferring part of the exposure. Entity matching requires these roles to be documented.
There is also a boundary around missingness. Public placement databases ordinarily offer greater visibility into publicly described transactions than private reinsurance arrangements. The absence of a public entry is ambiguous: there may be no relevant activity, a transaction may be private, the record may be out of date or the event may not meet the source's coverage definition. An explicit unknown category or a documented exclusion is scientifically superior to substituting a zero. Country-level license statistics are useful for identifying populations that a public securities register may fail to represent, but they cannot supply the amount of undisclosed issuance without further evidence.
The empirical design adopted below provides one reproducible, narrowly defined historical comparison, followed by independent recent institutional indicators. It avoids constructing an apparent worldwide 2026 domicile ranking from a combination of incomparable partial series.
Historical concentration of public catastrophe bond issuance
Aon Securities LLC (2022), in Exhibit 3 on issuer domiciles, publishes counts of Rule 144A transactions for two consecutive twelve-month periods ending June 30. Direct placements are excluded. The data identify jurisdictions used for issuance in the specified population. They do not represent all securities or all insurance risk transfer.
| Domicile | Period ending June 2021 | Period ending June 2022 |
|---|---|---|
| Bermuda | 38 | 41 |
| Singapore | 7 | 5 |
| Cayman Islands | 3 | 3 |
| Ireland | 2 | 2 |
| United Kingdom | 1 | 1 |
| United States | 0 | 1 |
| Hong Kong | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 51 | 54 |
Source: Aon Securities LLC (2022), ILS Annual Report 2022, Exhibit 3, p. 8. Calculations below use these reported counts; the extracted PDF table was available, but independent rendering of the source page failed.
The total grew by three transactions, or 5.88%. Bermuda's count grew from 38 to 41, or 7.89%, while the combined total of the remaining locations was 13 in both periods. In descriptive net-count terms, all of the aggregate increase occurred in Bermuda. This is not evidence that the same deals migrated between domiciles; the two observations are aggregate flows, not linked individual records.
The Bermudian share rose from 38/51 = 74.51% to 41/54 = 75.93%, an increase of 1.42 percentage points. Singapore's share fell from 13.73% to 9.26%. The Cayman Islands maintained three transactions while the expanding denominator reduced its share from 5.88% to 5.56%. The combined Bermuda-Cayman count share moved from 41/51 = 80.39% to 44/54 = 81.48%.
The two largest locations in both periods were Bermuda and Singapore. Their combined share declined from 45/51 = 88.24% to 46/54 = 85.19%. This statistic and the increase in Bermuda's individual share express different features of the evolving distribution. The lower top-two concentration ratio records the relative decline of the second location, while the stronger first location dominates the squared-share measure.
For the first period the sum of squared counts is 1,507. Dividing by 51 squared gives H = 0.5794. For the second the squared counts sum to 1,722, so H = 0.5905 after division by 54 squared. On a 10,000-point scale these are approximately 5,794 and 5,905. The effective number of locations is about 1.73 and 1.69 respectively. Thus the positive-count jurisdictions expanded from five to seven while the distribution of activity became slightly more concentrated by HHI.
This is a useful empirical counterexample to a common inference in geographical market analysis. A greater number of locations establishes wider participation, but it need not establish a more even allocation of transactions. The relative weight of the dominant location determines much of the concentration statistic. An entrant's inaugural transaction can be institutionally important despite its small immediate effect on overall shares. The development of alternative locations and the persistence of concentration can consequently occur at the same time.
Two additional limitations govern the result. First, an equal weight for every deal makes no adjustment for size or insured risk. A large multi-tranche transaction and a small single-tranche transaction each enter the count as one unit if the source counts them that way. Second, a geographical grouping combines multiple separately managed entities. One cannot treat the Bermuda count as one firm's share, nor the Singapore count as a single competitor. The selected HHI indicates a distribution of domiciliary activity and should be read as such.
The same report contains observations illustrating the geographic dispersion of insured risk. Its description of Nakama Re identifies a Singapore-based issuing vehicle for Japanese earthquake protection. Its discussion of Astro Re identifies Singapore issuance for exposure in the United States. Those examples are sufficient to reject a mechanical identification of Asian issuer location with Asian covered peril. They do not establish the proportion of foreign exposure in the entire Singapore-issued population.
The two periods provide a precise historical baseline. They do not justify extrapolation to the present. A contemporary estimate would require a fresh, comparably specified database and reconciliation of the effect of direct issuers and private placements. This restraint is particularly important because the public market has subsequently expanded. A rising absolute count at an established offshore center can coincide with either a rising or falling share of global issuance depending on the pace of activity elsewhere.
Bermuda and the institutional economics of an established hub
Bermuda's importance is first observable in the preceding historical issuance data. Its prominence is also manifested in the supervisory and securities-market infrastructure through which risk transfer is organized. The insurance licensing requirements published by the Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA, n.d.) distinguish special-purpose insurance authorizations, including restricted and unrestricted categories, from the separate collateralized insurer classification. The regulatory vocabulary itself is evidence that counting entities requires attention to their permissions.
A classification appropriate for an insurance supervision exercise may aggregate institutions that perform different activities in the securities market. A special-purpose insurer with one or several outstanding bond series and a collateralized insurer undertaking a broader set of funded reinsurance arrangements may both contribute to alternative risk capital. Their presence in the same jurisdiction does not make every contract a listed catastrophe bond. Conversely, an issuance series can remain within market data even when a new legal vehicle was unnecessary.
The government's statements about BMA annual reporting give a recent instrument-based indicator. Its 2024 annual report statement (Government of Bermuda, 2025) reports 156 new ILS for 2024 against 195 in 2023, a fall of 20%. The 2025 annual report statement (Government of Bermuda, 2026) records 209 new ILS against 156 a year before, an increase of approximately 33.97%. The 2025 number exceeds the 2023 figure by 14, or 7.18%. These counts concern the category described by the government, and no conversion into worldwide market share is attempted.
For an illustration of the entity side of the market, Evans (2026) reports Bermuda ILS vehicle registrations derived from BMA records. His account identifies 23 restricted and two unrestricted special-purpose insurer registrations in 2025, compared with 19 and two respectively in 2024, and ten additional collateralized insurer registrations in 2025. This is secondary reporting and the individual license records have not been independently reconstructed. It corroborates the need to preserve the distinction between registration and instrument activity.
It would be tempting to divide 209 by 25 and report the resulting 8.36 as the average number of 2025 issues per new special-purpose insurer. Such a calculation is not valid as an empirical productivity measure. The numerator can include issuances associated with earlier entities and possibly other instrument classifications, while the denominator comprises new registrations alone. The arithmetic is determinate; the interpretation would be unsupported. Proper matching requires entity identifiers and the transaction dates corresponding to each issuer.
Bermuda also has an exchange-listing role. The BSX listings leader report (Bermuda Stock Exchange, n.d.) describes approximately 92% of the outstanding catastrophe bond market as listed on the Bermuda Stock Exchange at year-end 2024, citing trade-market data. The figure identifies the prominence of a venue in the attributed population. It is not Bermuda's percentage of incorporated catastrophe bond issuers and it is not a measure of residents' invested capital. Nor is its comparison with the 2022 transaction-count share a measure of a change in domiciliary market position.
The institutional interpretation begins with the nature of recurring production. Sponsors regularly need legal documentation, reliable counterparty arrangements, collateral structures, approvals and investor communication. The establishment of reusable processes can reduce the time and uncertainty involved in coordinating these activities. Experience across multiple transactions may allow providers to identify operational problems earlier. A market with recurring issues may also facilitate comparison of service providers and provide a pool of experienced personnel.
These are plausible economic mechanisms of an established issuer cluster. The observed concentration is consistent with them, but concentration by itself supplies no identification of the magnitude of a cost advantage. Other explanations include historical sponsor relationships, eligibility constraints, legal recognition, issue-specific exposures, investor familiarity and the organizational preferences of arranging firms. The institutional mechanisms can reinforce one another. For example, an established sponsor network may direct transactions to familiar providers, and a growing provider network can make the same location more attractive to new sponsors.
The offshore location of an issuer cannot be used as a substitute for evidence of tax treatment. Tax consequences depend on legal residence, the parties, the applicable rules and the particular facts. Likewise, a high concentration of issues cannot establish abuse, evasion or the absence of real risk transfer. An insurance market's scientific assessment should proceed from regulatory classifications and transaction substance. The key question is how effectively its institutions enable the specified allocation of uncertain loss.
The Cayman Islands and the interpretation of license stocks
The Cayman Islands offer a complementary view of offshore ILS markets because supervisory reporting provides a distinct entity category. The Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (CIMA, n.d.) describes Class C insurance licensing in terms of funded insurance or reinsurance arrangements with limited recourse to qualifying sources of funding, which can include securities and other instruments. This population may include catastrophe bond vehicles but extends beyond those securities.
CIMA's international insurance statistics (2026) report 17 Class C entities as of June 30, 2026, with gross premiums of approximately $1.037 billion and assets of approximately $4.822 billion. The corresponding reported international insurance population comprises 721 entities with approximately $189.630 billion in assets. Within these published totals, Class C accounts for about 2.36% of entities and 2.54% of assets. These are internal composition ratios for the specified Cayman reporting population. They are not global ILS shares.
Historical Class C counts in the same statistical source reinforce the stock-versus-flow distinction.
| Observation | Class C entities |
|---|---|
| 2018 | 25 |
| 2019 | 23 |
| 2020 | 23 |
| 2021 | 21 |
| 2022 | 21 |
| 2023 | 17 |
| 2024 | 18 |
| 2025 | 16 |
| June 2026 | 17 |
The 2025 year-end count is nine below 2018, a decline of 36%. The count at June 2026 is one above the preceding year-end observation. It would be incorrect to annualize that one-entity stock change as if it were a registration flow. The stock reflects arrivals and departures from the reporting population together with any relevant classification changes. Likewise, interpreting the nine-entity net decline as a nine-transaction decline would confuse active vehicles with securities issued.
The June 2026 Class C asset balance exceeds $4.8 billion even with a modest number of reported entities. This demonstrates the material monetary scale of the category within Cayman's wider insurance system. It does not tell us the face amount of catastrophe bonds outstanding, the volume of new subscriptions, the amount of collateral specifically eligible for catastrophe claims or the total risk assumed by Cayman vehicles. An insurer's assets and liabilities are balance-sheet measures; a note principal is a contractual measure.
Consider an explicitly hypothetical scenario in which two vehicles hold identical insurance-related asset values of $250 million each. The first matches a single outstanding note, while the second supports a collection of different contractual obligations involving funded reinsurance. Even if their asset accounting and currency valuation were identical, the two vehicles would not contribute the same number of securities to a public deal directory. A statistical investigator seeking a note-level inventory must examine the liabilities and instrument terms instead of relying on an aggregate asset field.
The observed Cayman figures establish the existence and continuing significance of a regulated special-purpose segment. They do not support a direct rank comparison with Bermuda's reported 209 ILS additions or with the historical Aon transaction counts. The scientific advantage of retaining these distinct measurements is that each source can be evaluated against its own reporting mandate.
For the study of offshore insurance more broadly, this has a substantive consequence. A jurisdiction's specialization may be visible in its institutional balance sheets without being equally visible in the segment of securities reported by commercial databases. The question of relative concentration therefore has no single answer independent of the chosen market perimeter. Public cat bond issuance, specialized insurance entities and wider funded reinsurance are intersecting populations with different coverage rules.
Asian issuer-market development and geographic reach
The development of Asian issuing jurisdictions brings the question of regional market formation into sharper focus. A location that serves both sponsors within its region and exposures elsewhere can develop financial infrastructure without immediately changing the regional distribution of insurable risks. Conversely, local risk can gain access to external capital through an issuer established elsewhere. An issuer market's function is thus not exhausted by the domestic insurance market's own catastrophe exposure.
The OECD's Asia-Pacific catastrophe bond trends (2024) describes the historical concentration of covered catastrophe risks in major markets, notably the United States, Europe and Japan, with more limited participation elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific. Such concentration is on the risk side. Establishing a securities issuance framework can broaden the geographic distribution of transactions without automatically expanding coverage of currently underinsured populations.
Aon's contemporaneous report records seven Singapore transactions in the year ending June 2021 and five in the following year. It also records the first public Rule 144A transaction using a Hong Kong issuer in June 2022. The same report describes an earlier Hong Kong transaction, Greater Bay Re, in 2021, demonstrating that entry into the public Rule 144A series and the first broader local ILS activity are different milestones.
The historical contrast illustrates the role of institutional development. The initial transactions in a new market supply precedents for subsequent arrangements. They can demonstrate the feasibility of coordinating relevant providers and supervisory processes. They can also expose areas in which policymakers and firms may need greater clarity or capacity. None of these possibilities amounts to proof of a persistent subsequent growth rate.
Some observed Asia-Pacific experience can be placed alongside the domicile counts. The OECD (2024) provides examples in its study of disaster-resilient regional development, including Singapore-based vehicles associated with Australian and New Zealand risk in 2019 and a New Zealand transaction in 2023. In that account, the amounts include AUD 75 million and NZD 225 million respectively. They are distinct denominations and are not summed. The cases show that an issuing jurisdiction can support risk protection for beneficiaries in neighboring markets and beyond.
The practical difficulty of widening participation is not simply that an insurance vehicle needs a place of incorporation. For a new issuance to attract capital, practitioners must establish a sufficiently interpretable risk definition, reliable means of determining contingent payment, and a legal and operational arrangement investors and beneficiaries can evaluate. The OECD's catastrophe bond market challenges (2024) examine several such constraints, including data availability, modeling and institutional preparedness. A weak exposure record can constrain the development of an investable security even if incorporation procedures are straightforward.
A sponsoring insurance entity may also require a minimum economically efficient transaction size. The fixed cost of legal work, risk modeling, administration, distribution and coordination can be significant relative to small volumes. A jurisdiction able to support repeat transactions could lower the recurring portion of these costs, while a subsidy offered for initial structuring can alter the cost allocation between parties without eliminating the underlying resources required. Neither mechanism is quantified here. A comparative cost study would need transaction-level fee data, time data and carefully defined alternative transactions.
The development of a regional issuer market is accordingly compatible with significant foreign risk exposure in its issued instruments. A reliable assessment of its contribution to the regional protection gap should instead trace which risks are covered, which ultimate beneficiaries can draw on the protection, how much contingent funding they obtain and on what terms. The number of local issuing vehicles is an intermediate institutional indicator.
Where historical grant programs or regulatory changes are discussed in period reports, their historical relevance must not be interpreted as a statement of current eligibility. Current Singapore and Hong Kong detailed incentive rules were not independently verified in this research; the monograph makes no representation about presently available subsidies or procedural approvals. The comparative inference concerns observed transactions and the institutional capacity demonstrated by them.
Other issuer forms and the separation of listing from domicile
Direct issuance by an international financial institution provides particularly clear evidence of the limits of the legal-domicile classification. The World Bank Treasury describes an IBRD capital-at-risk program in which notes can be issued directly. The instrument transfers defined contingent risk under an institutional arrangement that differs from the ordinary separately incorporated insurance vehicle.
In 2024 the World Bank announced a $150 million catastrophe bond for Jamaica. The Jamaica catastrophe bond announcement (World Bank, 2024) identified the IBRD issuance, indicated an expected Hong Kong Exchange listing and described protection across four hurricane seasons. The issuer was IBRD; Jamaica was the risk beneficiary. Hong Kong was the anticipated listing venue. The issuer announcement does not establish that an insurer licensed in Hong Kong was the issuing entity, and this study does not independently verify the subsequent admission record.
The announcement is also interesting because the nominal amount names protection available subject to the contract. It is not an unconditional transfer of $150 million at the issue date. Capital at risk is contingent. Paying or receiving the initial consideration for the security, maintaining the protection, and releasing the contingent proceeds after a contractually relevant event are separate economic stages.
In November 2025 the World Bank's Hurricane Melissa payout announcement declared that the Jamaica bond had triggered its full $150 million payout. The statement supplies evidence of the contingent payment reported by the issuer. It is not a transaction-level reconciliation of investor accounts, a legal determination of every contractual issue or a measure of total hurricane losses. The transaction's parametric mechanism addresses the specified insurance event, and its activation does not mean that all economic losses of the beneficiary were compensated.
In May 2026 the World Bank announced a replacement risk-transfer transaction. The new Jamaica protection issuance (World Bank, 2026) records a $200 million IBRD catastrophe bond with an anticipated Singapore Exchange listing. The announced nominal protection exceeded the 2024 issuance by $50 million, or 33.33%. That number does not measure Jamaica's net receipt of premiums, a cumulative outstanding exposure of $350 million, or the increase in all national insurance protection. The 2024 bond had already been reported as fully triggered.
| Observation | Issuing institution | Risk beneficiary | Amount | Venue or event |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| April 2024 announcement | IBRD | Jamaica | USD 150m | Intended Hong Kong Exchange listing |
| November 2025 announcement | IBRD program | Jamaica | USD 150m | Full contingent payout announced |
| May 2026 announcement | IBRD | Jamaica | USD 200m | Intended Singapore Exchange listing |
Sources: World Bank (2024, 2025, 2026). The table records announcements; actual listing admission has not been separately established.
The analytical value of the sequence lies in the persistence of the issuing institution and risk beneficiary alongside a change in the announced exchange venue. A geography-of-issuance study organized around licensed offshore corporate entities should retain the direct issuer in a separately identified category. A broader capital-market venue analysis can capture the intended admissions and their relation to regional financial centers. Neither analysis needs to invent a domiciliary shift between Hong Kong and Singapore.
It is important to distinguish a multilateral institution's legal identity from the conventional concept of corporate nationality. Assigning IBRD issuance to a country merely because of an office address would obscure its institutional form. Depending on the intended denominator, researchers may include direct multilateral issues in a separate category, retain a limited SPV-only comparison, or analyze all securities by documented issuer type. Every choice should be justified and reported.
As the market develops, direct institutional access and special-purpose structures can coexist. The corporate issuer market and the multilateral issuance market serve partially overlapping insurance-financing needs. Their substitutability depends on the beneficiary's eligibility, objectives, the costs and terms available, and the particular risk. The observation that one mechanism has supplied protection in a documented case does not establish that it is available to all sponsors.
Market organization, costs, and comparative research
An issuer jurisdiction's role emerges from the organization of services and relationships needed to bring a contingent risk instrument into existence and manage it throughout the instrument's life. The issuer carries legal obligations, but the quality of the issuance depends on actions performed by multiple participants. It is therefore useful to distinguish domicile concentration from concentration in arrangement, administration, trustee services, custody, modeling or calculation-agent activity.
A legal vehicle can be established with contracted providers dispersed across financial centers. The resulting allocation of service responsibilities determines how an instrument operates, which systems must remain available, and which actors are in a position to identify and resolve an operational problem. A jurisdiction can gain from specialization through both direct domestic services and links to providers abroad. Counting only locally licensed issuing companies leaves these links unobserved.
The initial cost of establishing a transaction, its continuing operational costs, and the risk compensation paid to investors should be recorded separately in comparative research. As a purely illustrative example, suppose two candidate locations support otherwise identical $200 million transactions. Assume initial costs of $1.8 million and $1.2 million respectively, with equal recurring expenses. The immediate difference is $600,000, or 30 basis points of issued notional. Spread over an assumed three-year protection period without discounting, its simple equivalent is 10 basis points per year. This does not imply that an actual jurisdiction offers such a differential. It illustrates why a comparison of upfront fees should be translated using consistent transaction size and tenor assumptions.
If the locations instead differ in recurring costs, the calculation changes. An illustrative $150,000 annual recurring-cost difference amounts to $450,000 over three years on an undiscounted basis. Against the same $200 million transaction, it is 7.5 basis points per year. A comparison combining costs should consider the timing of payments, early termination, possible reuse of the vehicle, changes to the risk period and the opportunity cost of the payer's capital. Neither example incorporates a discount rate or a tax adjustment.
Differences in investor pricing may arise from several features that are correlated with issuer selection. Chatoro et al. (2023), in their primary-market issuer effect study, report a multilevel analysis of 794 bonds associated with 101 issuers during 1997–2020; their abstract attributes 26% of total price variation to issuer effects. This finding provides grounds for considering issuer-related heterogeneity when comparing bonds. It does not identify a causal effect of the legal domicile. The study's operational definitions and full estimations have not been independently replicated for this monograph.
An institution choosing a jurisdiction may also have an established record of previous issuance. Investors can observe the instrument's size, risk characteristics, trigger and term, along with the sponsor's reputation and some of the parties serving it. If experienced sponsors systematically choose one issuer location, an observed average spread difference could reflect these sponsor characteristics rather than a lower cost of issuing within that location. The same logic applies if a new location initially specializes in unfamiliar perils or risk layers.
An empirical investigation intended to estimate a domicile effect would need a carefully matched set of transactions. Variables could include perils, geography, expected loss, trigger type, attachment and exhaustion, maturity, terms relating to collateral, issue date, sponsor, issuer structure and observable fees. Fixed effects for period and sponsor could help to assess some sources of variation, but treatment selection and unobserved risk characteristics remain obstacles. The relatively rare occurrence of otherwise equivalent transactions switching domicile is relevant to identification. No such causal estimation is undertaken here.
Research on the relation between reinsurance and catastrophe bonds suggests a separate explanation for variation across issuer markets. Götze and Gürtler (2022), in Risk transfer beyond reinsurance, examine circumstances in which catastrophe bonds can add value to an insurance risk-transfer program, including the relevance of reinsurance counterparty risk, basis risk and protection layers. The decision to use capital-market instruments is shaped by the risk program before the question of issuing jurisdiction is resolved. The properties of the transactions seen in a particular offshore center are therefore partly shaped by selection into catastrophe bond issuance itself.
For illustration, a sponsor may seek coverage for a high layer that responds only to large modeled or realized events. Another may require a different shape of insurance protection that is difficult to express as a security with a transparent trigger. Even if both sponsors engage the same service providers, their optimal risk-transfer arrangements could differ. An observed increase in ILS issuance may reflect one group of risks becoming more attractive to capital markets without signaling a general preference for securitization in every layer.
The market significance of a domicile has at least two dimensions that can develop simultaneously: the ability to support a variety of issuer structures and the scale of recurring transactions. Comparative institutional study can establish that a location has mechanisms relevant to these activities and show observed examples. Attributing the relative volume of business to regulatory speed, a grant, a legal doctrine, or the local tax regime requires stronger research than the available aggregate statistics supply.
Concentration, continuity, and supervisory observability
Geographical concentration matters because the financial industry uses institutions and infrastructure whose continuity is itself a condition of effective risk transfer. An offshore issuer may have arrangements intended to isolate the assets backing its obligations. Yet timely performance also depends on event data, contractual notices, operational access to assets and competent administration. Legal separation of entities addresses a particular class of risk; it does not independently establish uninterrupted operation of every shared service.
The significant historical concentration of transactions in Bermuda is therefore informative as a question for institutional resilience. It identifies a jurisdiction in which a substantial share of the observed public issuance arrangements was established. To estimate vulnerability to a jurisdiction-specific disruption, however, one would need to know the relevant functions that are actually dependent upon institutions there, including the possibility of continuing operations through authorized agents elsewhere. The HHI derived above supplies no estimate of losses in such a scenario.
A simple hypothetical stress example clarifies the distinction. Suppose a portfolio has $1 billion in principal across four catastrophe bonds with equal $250 million notional. Three issuers are in Bermuda and one elsewhere. By count and principal, Bermuda accounts for 75% of the selected portfolio. If the four bonds share a common calculation agent, the exposure to the operational continuity of that agent is 100%, regardless of the domiciliary shares. If the four bonds use independently functioning calculation systems, that particular common exposure may be smaller. Neither case establishes the probabilities or losses that would be associated with interruption.
A distinct risk scenario involves two issuer jurisdictions whose vehicles both cover the same hurricane region. The legal location of the instruments is divided, yet the market can remain exposed to a common catastrophic event. For the assessment of correlated principal impairment, covered peril and contractual trigger matter more directly than the corporate addresses. A portfolio with four issuer domiciles need not be well-diversified by catastrophe risk. Conversely, concentrated issuer locations can support risks from diverse regions and perils.
These distinctions imply that diversification should always be attached to an explicitly named object. Diversification of domicile choice may improve the range of available issuing institutions. Diversification of service providers may improve access to independent operational pathways. Diversification of exposures may reduce the tendency of principal losses to occur together. Diversification of capital sources may improve the ability to replace capital following a risk event. The extent of each effect depends on verified relationships and contractual terms.
Supervisory observability also varies among market indicators. Registration records can identify an authorized institution even when its individual securities or insurance arrangements are not publicly visible. Exchanges can identify admission of securities even when their insurance obligations cannot be reconstructed from listing summaries. Insurance regulators and central securities depositories have different information responsibilities. A source that is authoritative for its own function may remain incomplete for the scientific question at hand.
This study has adopted a conservative evidence treatment: counts of new instruments, numbers of entities and market statistics are reported in the populations in which they appear. Further analysis would benefit from harmonized reporting on changes to issuer identity, license status, deal identifiers and outstanding principal. Confidentiality restrictions can constrain publicly available information, and aggregate published series can support valid descriptive analysis despite these constraints. They require transparent definitions.
For a regulator evaluating the consequences of intermediation concentration, the distinction between observed volume and actual continuity risk provides a work program of concrete questions. Which operational functions are dependent on a single provider? How are supporting assets held and transferred under different stress events? Can agents be replaced consistently with regulatory and contractual requirements? Where would event data and notices remain accessible? These concerns arise from institutional analysis, not from the assumption that an offshore issuer is intrinsically unsafe.
Investor due diligence involves related concerns but a different allocation of interest. The investor evaluates the instrument's contingent principal risk and operational performance, while the sponsor is concerned with enforceable availability of the specified protection. Their objectives align in the need for reliable contract administration but need not align in every disputed trigger or settlement. Institutional concentration may matter to both; its relevance depends on how the specific transaction distributes rights and responsibilities.
Implications for risk protection and future research
Offshore ILS issuer markets contribute to the financial capacity available for catastrophe risk transfer by providing institutions through which investor funds and insurance contingent liabilities can be coordinated. Their contribution to the protection of economies is determined by the resulting effective obligations, not simply by the stock of securities or the number of entities incorporated.
The Jamaica sequence provides an observed instance of a catastrophe-linked arrangement producing a declared contingent payout. Its significance is the correspondence between a documented instrument, the relevant event and the issuer's announcement. A rigorous evaluation of the wider economic effect would require evidence on how the beneficiary used the proceeds, the timing relative to rebuilding needs, other insurance and public financial resources, and the losses not covered. Those data are beyond the evidence inspected here.
An economy with severe disaster exposure may be unable to obtain the full coverage it seeks at acceptable cost. The limitation can arise from the price of tail risk, the quality of risk information, affordability constraints, legal or fiscal restrictions, or the nature of available instruments. The presence of a regional issuer hub is potentially advantageous where it facilitates procurement and repeated access, but does not by itself remove the underlying constraints. A jurisdiction hosting large securities volumes may in fact transfer risks predominantly originating elsewhere.
International comparison can become more precise by maintaining separate tables for new issues, outstanding notes, active special-purpose insurance licenses, newly registered entities, exchange listings, and covered peril territories. Each table should identify its reporting date or period and its coverage boundary. Crosswalks between them should be built through actual identifiers. Data about ultimate investors and service providers can be added when the observed information permits. These are ordinary research-design requirements, not a proposed new theoretical system.
A useful longitudinal comparison would revisit the same Rule 144A universe examined in the two historical periods, reconcile name and entity changes, and document the rules for including direct placements or multilateral structures. It would then compute not only transaction-count concentration but also original-issue-volume and outstanding-principal concentration. Sensitivity analysis could exclude transactions where the relevant issuer location remains uncertain and show bounds under alternative assignments. It should avoid interpreting missing domicile values as proof that a residual jurisdiction has no business.
To examine differences between license populations and securities issuance, researchers would require a jurisdiction-level crosswalk from vehicle authorization to identifiable transactions and funded obligations. Such an investigation could distinguish reusable issuance programs, dormant or run-off entities and actively issuing entities. An annual asset balance could then be related to the corresponding liability categories, rather than treated indiscriminately as catastrophe bond face value.
A causal study of market entry and incentives requires information on the timing and scope of the institutional changes under examination. An apparent increase in transactions following a reform may also occur in the presence of an expanding global ILS market, new sponsor programs, significant catastrophe losses or changes in reinsurance prices. A before-and-after comparison alone will rarely isolate the institutional effect. Appropriate comparison groups, examination of pre-reform patterns and identification of concurrent changes are necessary. In the absence of that design, the correct description is an observed change occurring within a specified historical setting.
The evidence limits of the present inquiry remain material. A complete live global deal inventory for 2026, verified exchange admission records for the two Jamaica announcements, harmonized domicile-specific principal amounts, detailed fee data and current operative legal texts for each Asian market have not been obtained. The study therefore provides a historically grounded and recently contextualized institutional comparison. Its results can discipline the interpretation of subsequent data without claiming to replace those data.
Conclusion
Offshore insurance-linked securities issuer markets constitute a specialized component of the worldwide organization of insurance risk transfer. Their principal observable function is the provision of legal and institutional arrangements through which specified insurance risks can be connected to committed investor capital. The location of that activity describes one dimension of the global insurance market, alongside risk origin, sponsor residence, supervisory authority, securities admission and the distribution of services and investment.
The historical transaction comparison demonstrates the simultaneous expansion of represented locations and an increase in geographical count concentration. Bermuda's dominance persisted within the specified sample, while additional locations became represented. In retrospect, the significance of market entry cannot be evaluated solely through changes in the number of jurisdictions or a single concentration ratio. Those indicators describe different features of a distribution and may move in different directions.
The recent Bermuda figures and Cayman Class C series establish the continuing importance of specialized offshore institutions under different reporting conventions. These data must remain distinct from an internationally harmonized measure of issuance or outstanding contingent principal. The Asian examples confirm that institutions can enable cross-border access to capital without a corresponding one-to-one expansion of domestic insured exposures. The direct IBRD Jamaica transactions show especially clearly that issuer identity, the beneficiary and the anticipated exchange can be different attributes of the same instrument.
The scientific conclusion is that issuer-market diversification and insurance-risk diversification require independent assessment. Institutional locations can proliferate while service dependencies remain concentrated, and geographical concentration of issuing entities can coexist with a dispersion of insured perils. The actual financial contribution of the issuer markets is determined through the instruments and obligations they support. Their geographical measurement gains explanatory power when the institutional attributes are preserved and linked to the economic substance of risk transfer.
This conclusion is an analytical synthesis of documented observations and explicit calculations. It establishes neither a new theory nor a causal ranking of jurisdictions. It provides a defensible interpretation of offshore ILS markets and specifies the empirical work needed to extend that interpretation to a comprehensive, contemporary account of the world's issuer and risk-bearing networks.
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